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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The 7th NFC Award of 2009 has generally been recognised as a historic 
achievement of the present democratically elected government. Not only was consensus 
achieved after a gap of 12 years among the Federal and Provincial Governments but 
major strides have also been made in furthering the process of fiscal decentralisation in 
the country. The Federal Government will be transferring substantially more resources to 
the provinces by a major enhancement in the collective share of the latter from the 
divisible pool taxes. In addition, the provinces have agreed to a horizontal sharing 
formula that includes multiple criteria and promises greater fiscal equalisation in favour 
of the more backward provinces. Straight transfers have also been rationalised and the 
Federal Government has agreed to pay in instalments the substantial arrears that had 
accumulated under different heads.  
The first set of post-NFC budgets have been announced for 2010-11. Some of the 
consequences of the Award have become visible. The Federal Government is pushing for 
a strong fiscal adjustment by reducing the target for the consolidated fiscal deficit from 
6.3 percent of the GDP in 2009-10 to 4 percent in 2010-11, as part of the agreement in 
the on-going SBA with the IMF. This is predicated, first, on a virtually zero growth in 
Federal current expenditure and a modest growth in development expenditure coupled 
with a relatively strong fiscal effort and, second, on the inability of the provinces to 
absorb fully the large post-NFC increase in transfers in the short run, thereby leading to a 
large build up in cash balances of upto one percent of the GDP. 
But, a number of issues have risen already with regard to the implications of the 
radical change in inter-governmental relations after the 7th NFC Award. Has the 
underlying structural fiscal deficit been raised once-and-for-all by the Award? Can the 
Federal Government restrain the real growth in its expenditures given the downward 
rigidities in security expenditure, debt servicing, costs of civil administration and 
increasingly now in subsidies and transfer payments? What is the incentive for the 
Federal Government in a democratic dispensation to raise the tax burden and incur the 
political costs thereof while transferring a major part of the additional revenues to the 
Provincial Governments, which may be on the other side of the political divide as is the 
case currently in the largest province, Punjab? Given the quantum jump in transfers are 
the provinces likely to show financial discipline or engage in runaway spending and 
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waste scarce public resources? Should incentives be put in place on top of the Award to 
promote greater fiscal effort and economy in current expenditure by provincial 
governments?  
The purpose of this paper is to offer an initial answer to these questions. Using 
theoretical models to capture fiscal decisions by Federal and Provincial 
Governments, the paper aims to study historically the nature of federal and provincial 
responses respectively to changes in inter-governmental fiscal relations in the 
aftermath of various awards. Section 2 sets up a theoretical model for fiscal 
behaviour by the Federal Government and the corresponding model of provincial 
governments. Section 3 presents estimates of the behavioural equations. Section 4 
quantifies the likely impact of the NFC Award on the consolidated fiscal deficit. 
Section 5 gives the key policy implications of the research findings. Finally, in 
Section 6 are presented the conclusions. 
 
2.  THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
We first develop the theoretical framework for analysis of the fiscal behaviour by 
the Federal Government. 
 
Federal Government 
The approach generally adopted is to assume that politicians /officials maximise 
the utility of a typical citizen subject to a budget constraint [Slack (1980); Henderson 
(1968); Ghaus and Pasha (1994)]. Utility is a function of the quantity of goods and 
services provided by the government and on the level of consumption of private goods. 
Ghaus, et al. (1994) have demonstrated that for every rupee increase in transfers to 
provincial governments there is a 61 paisa increase in expenditure. 
We designate the following: Y = income, Rf = tax revenue, fN = non-tax revenue 
(exogeneously given), fD = target level of deficit financing by borrowing. All variables 
are measured in real per capita terms.
1
 If β is the proportion of tax revenues retained by 
the Federal Government as per the operative NFC Award, then 
ffff DNRE   … … … … … … (1) 
Where Ef = level of public expenditure in real per capita terms.  
The utility function of the Federal Government is given by 
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This is analogous to the Stone-Geary utility function.  
This utility is maximised with respect to Rf
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Price indices for public and private goods are assumed to be the same. 
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which yields 
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Therefore, the higher  is the larger the magnitude of revenues retained, R, by the 
Federal Government. 
From (3) we also have that 
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This is important finding. The impact on the level of fiscal effort of the Federal 
Government as measured by the level of tax revenues, R, of changes in  is ambiguous. If 
the minimum level, Eo, of public expenditure exceeds the sum of non-tax revenues, Nf, 
and deficit financing, fD , then a fall in  following the 7th NFC Award is likely to 
stimulate a positive response by the Federal Government in terms of raising the level of 
tax revenues. 
From (1) and (3) we also obtain that 
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The target deficit can be expressed as  
yD f 10   … … … … … … … (6) 
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At this stage, we allow for a lagged adjustment process to the desired fiscal 
magnitudes. That is 
)()*)(1()( 111  fff RRR  … … … … … (7) 
Where  (Rf
*
) is given by (3). Similarly, 
)*))(1( 122  fff EEE  … … … … … (8) 
It can be seen from (7) and (8) that if (2 > 11), due to downward rigidities in 
expenditure, then the deficit rises temporarily of the Federal Government following the 
Award. 
We have finally that he equations to be estimated from the data are as follows: 
],,,[)( 11  fff RNYfR  … … … … … … (9) 
and 
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We turn now to the theoretical framework for the Provincial Governments. 
 
Provincial Governments 
In this case, we use the suffix p instead of f. 
The expenditure level of the Provincial Governments is given by 
pppp DNRTFE   … … … … … … (11) 
Where TF is the total divisible pool transfer and  
TF = (1 – ) R1f … … … … … … (12) 
The utility function of the provincial governments is given by  
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This implies that higher transfers lead to some slackening of fiscal effort by 
provincial governments. 
Also, 
OPPop EDTFyyE  )1())(1(  … … … … (15)  
and 
0)1( 


TF
EP  
As expected, higher transfers are accompanied by a rise in expenditure by 
provincial governments. As in the case of the Federal Government, we postulate in the 
case of Provincial Governments that there is a lagged process of adjustment to desired 
levels of own tax revenue and expenditure following the NFC Award. 
 
3.  ESTIMATED RESULTS 
The respective expenditure and revenue equations for the federal and 
provincial governments (combined) have been estimated by the use of the OLS 
technique for the period, 1987-88 to 2009-10, during the tenure of which three NFC 
awards have been announced. All variables are measured in real per capita terms to 
avoid problems of non-stationarity and spurious correlations. The results obtained are 
described below. 
 
Federal Government 
Tax Revenues: As shown in Table 1, tax revenues (RFDPTX) of the Federal 
Government have a negative relationship with the share of revenues (BETA) retained 
from the divisible pool. Therefore, historically the federal government has tended to 
enhance its fiscal effort in the aftermath of awards which mandated larger transfers to the 
provinces. A similar response can also be expected after the 7th NFC Award, which has 
led to a big decline in BETA. Also, it appears that a one rupee increase in non-tax 
revenues leads to a decline in fiscal effort of almost 34 paisas. 
 
Table 1 
Results of Regression Analysis on Determinants of Federal Budgetary Magnitudes 
(All Variables Measured in Real Per Capita Terms) 
 Tax  
Revenue 
Current  
Expenditure 
Development 
Expenditure 
Variablea (RFDPTX) (RFCE) (RFDE) 
Constant 1187.5 (2.624)* 1002.5 (3.477)* –751.6 (–1.796)* 
Per Capita Income (RPCY) 0.085 (9.541)* 0.046 (3.475)* 0.010 (2.372)* 
Share of Divisible Pool Retained (BETA) –864.1 (–1.748)** – 1298.0 (2.644)* 
Federal Non-Tax Revenues (FNTR) –0.335 (–2.337)* – – 
Lagged Dependent Variable – 0.328 (2.681)* 0.472 (5.045)* 
R2 0.969 0.921 0.864 
D-W 2.230 2.464 2.366 
Figures in brackets are t-ratios. 
a For individual equations, one or two specific dummy variables have been used to capture outlier values. Only 
significant variables are included. 
  *Significant at 5 percent level. 
**Significant at 10 percent level. 
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Non-tax Revenues: These are assumed to be exogeneously determined. 
Current Expenditure: Current Expenditure of the Federal Government appears to 
be largely invariant with respect to the share, BETA, in the divisible pool. As highlighted 
earlier, there are strong downward rigidities with respect to expenditures on debt 
servicing, defence, general administration etc.  
This demonstrated inability of the Federal Government to contract, following an 
Award which transfers more resources to the provinces, is the basic behavioural 
assymetry which could lead to an increase in the underlying structural fiscal deficit. The 
other part of this assymetry is the likely rapid expansion in provincial budgets following 
the receipt of larger transfers. 
Development Expenditure: Development expenditure of the Federal Government 
does appear to be responsive to the availability of resources, as indicated by the 
magnitude of BETA. However, there is a process of lagged adjustment here as the 
coefficient of the previous years’ level of development expenditure is large and 
significant. This implies that the federal PSDP will take some time to come down to the 
desired size given the fall in growth of net revenue receipts in the first year after the 7th 
NFC Award. 
 
Provincial Governments 
Tax Revenues: As shown in Table 2, there is a negative relationship, as 
hypothesised, between provincial own tax revenues and the level of transfers from the 
divisible pool. The provinces are inclined to slacken their fiscal effort in the event of a 
favourable award, like the latest dispensation. This is another factor which contributes to 
an increase in the consolidated fiscal deficit. However, the magnitude of the behavioural 
response is small. A one rupee increase in transfers leads to five paisa fall in provincial 
tax revenues. 
 
Table 2 
Results of Regression Analysis on Determinants of Provincial Budgetary Magnitudes 
(All Variables in Real Per Capita Terms) 
 Tax  
Revenues 
Current  
Expenditure 
Development 
Expenditure 
Variablea (RPTR) (RPCE) (RFDE) 
Constant 21.5 (1.006) –87.6 (–0.687) –200.1 (–1.621) 
Per Capita Income (RPCY) 0.006 (4.341)* 0.027 (3.139)* 0.010 (1.994)** 
Transfers from Divisible Pool (RDPTRF) –0.049 (–2.101) 0.402 (2.513)* – 
Revenue Surplus (RDPTRF– 
   RPCE+RPTR+RPNTR) 
 
– 
 
– 
 
0.376 (2.695)* 
Lagged Dependent Variable – – 0.566 (5.818)* 
R2 0.585 0.906 0.954 
D-W 1.478 2.674 1.771 
Figures in brackets are t-ratios. 
  *Significant at 5 percent level. 
**Significant at 10 percent level. 
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Non-tax Revenues: These are assumed to be exogeneously determined. 
Current Expenditure: Current expenditure of Provincial Governments appears 
to respond quickly and strongly to larger transfers. The absence of a significant 
lagged variable indicates that the process of adjustment is more less, instantaneous. 
A one rupee increase in transfers leads to a more than 40 paisa rise in current 
expenditure. 
Development Expenditure: The combined ADP of the Provincial 
Governments also appears to be linked to the size of the revenue surplus, which is 
likely to be larger when transfers increase. However, there is a process of lagged 
adjustment here indicating that, especially in the case of the smaller Provincial 
Governments, there are limits to absorption capacity, in terms of implementation of a 
larger portfolio of projects. 
Results of the empirical analysis of past fiscal behaviour indicate that in the 
aftermath of an Award which expands the share of provinces, the consolidated fiscal 
deficit tends to rise because there are no corresponding cutbacks in federal current 
expenditure, the fall in the size of the PSDP is accomplished with some time lag, 
while provincial current expenditure rises rapidly in response to larger transfe rs. This 
impact is somewhat moderated by the launching of a more intensive fiscal effort 
through tax reforms by the Federal Government to at least partially make up for the 
loss in net revenue receipts. Also, provincial ADPs take some time to fully adjust 
upwards. 
Given these contrasting behavioural responses, the net impact on the overall fiscal 
deficit of an Award like the 7th NFC Award is ambiguous. Based on the estimated 
equations, we project next the relevant budgetary magnitudes for the federal and 
provincial governments in the presence and in the absence of the 7th NFC Award. This 
will enable derivation of the impact on the combined fiscal deficit and on the deficit of 
the respective governments. 
 
4.  BUDGETARY PROJECTIONS 
Table 3 presents the budgetary projections for 2010-11 with and without the 7th 
NFC Award. These projections are compared with the estimates announced in the Budget 
of 2010-11 by the Federal and the Provincial Governments. 
A number of important conclusions emerge from the table. First, given the targets 
embodied in the on-going SBA with the IMF, the budget documents are very optimistic 
in projecting that the consolidated fiscal deficit will be reduced sharply to 4 percent of the 
GDP from 6.3 percent in 2009-10. This implies that either the NFC Award is conducive 
to deficit reduction or that the scaling down of the deficit will be achieved despite the 
award. 
The first area of optimism is with regard to the growth of federal tax revenues, 
which are expected to rise by 26.7 percent, substantially in excess of the nominal growth 
in GDP of 14.4 percent expected at the time of the framing of the budget. The equation 
for federal tax revenues estimated in Table 1 indicates a more moderate growth of 17.6 
percent, which includes an incremental fiscal effort of Rs 35 billion on top of the revenue 
expectation in the absence of the 7th NCF Award. 
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Table 3 
Projection of Consolidated Budget* 
(Rs in Billion) 
 
2009-10 
(Revised) 
2010-11 
(Budget) 
Projections, 2010-11 
Without 7th 
NFC Award 
With 7th 
NFC Award 
(a) Revenue 2079 2607 2437.1 2463.4 
 Tax Revenues 1500 1907 1737.1 1763.4 
      Federal
a
 1445 1831 1665.0 1700.1 
      Provincial 55 76 72.1 63.3 
 Non-tax Revenues 579 700 700.0 700.0 
      Federal 495 634 634.0 634.0 
      Provincial 84 66 66.0 66.0 
(b) Expenditure 3040 3293 3274.1 3348.7 
 Current Expenditure 2482 2696 2644.9 2736.2 
     Federal 1855 1866 1897.1 1897.1 
     Provincial 627 830 747.8 839.1 
 Development  
  Expenditure 558 597 629.2 612.6 
     Federal 299 257 345.3 292.6 
     Provincial 259 340 283.9 319.9 
(c) Budget Deficit  –961 –686 –837 –885 
 % of GDP –6.3 –4.0 –4.9 –5.2 
*Without allowing for the impact of the floods. 
a Including non-FBR revenues of Rs 142 billion in 2010-11. 
 
Turning to federal current expenditure, the budget expects to contain the growth in 
2010-11 to only 0.6 percent. This is to be achieved despite the higher costs of 
implementing the salary award of a 50 percent hike in basic pay and increase in other 
allowances. The estimated equation indicates somewhat more growth. 
The federal budget also anticipates a fall in development spending in the PSDP of 
over 14 percent. However, the estimated equation for federal development expenditure 
reveals that the likelihood is for only a small fall in the first year after the NFC Award. 
Nevertheless, this is over Rs 52 billion less than the level projected in the absence of the 
Award. 
Provincial governments have also made optimistic projections about the growth 
rate of their tax revenues in 2010-11 at over 38 percent. The historical evidence, as 
highlighted earlier, is for these governments to slacken their fiscal effort following the 
receipt of larger transfers. As such, the equation for provincial tax revenues indicates a 
more modest growth of 15 percent, with the level about Rs 9 billion less than what could 
have been achieved in the absence of the NFC award. 
As far as provincial current expenditure is concerned, budget estimates and 
estimates from the relevant equation are close to each other. It is important to note that 
larger NFC transfers will stimulate current expenditure of provincial governments by as 
much as Rs 91 billion, a large part of which will go towards financing the salary hike. 
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Development expenditures have been shown as rising rapidly by over 31 percent 
in the provincial budgets. But, as indicated above, the smaller provincial governments 
like Balochistan, may not be able to raise the capacity to execute a much larger 
development program in the short run. As such, the shortfall could be about Rs 20 billion 
in relation the budget estimates. However, this will still be Rs 36 billion higher than the 
level that would have been attained in the absence of the NFC Award. Overall, the 
equations used for forecasting federal and provincial revenues and expenditure indicate 
that the likely level of the consolidated fiscal deficit in 2010-11 is 5.2 percent of the GDP 
in relation to the original budgeted level of 4 percent of the GDP. We also have the 
conclusion that in the first year after the NFC Award the consolidated budget deficit is 
likely to be Rs 48 billion higher, equivalent to 0.3 percent of the GDP, than would have 
been the case in the absence of the NFC Award. 
In terms of the extent of fiscal decentralisation, the 7th NFC Award is expected to 
increase the combined share of the provincial governments in public expenditure from 29 
percent in 2009-10 to 35 percent in 2010-11. This is a big jump and Pakistan will 
approach an intermediate level of fiscal decentralisation. In particular, provincial 
governments will now account for the major share of development expenditure. 
Table 4 indicates that the increase in the federal deficit is even larger at about 0.6 
percent of the GDP following the NFC Award. This is partly compensated for by a 
decline in the combined fiscal deficit of provincial governments of 0.3 percent of the 
GDP. 
Overall, we have the conclusion that the 7th NFC Award has led to some 
deterioration in the underlying structural fiscal deficit of the Federal and Provincial 
Governments combined, albeit by a relatively small magnitude of about 0.3 percent of the 
GDP. However, this impact could increase as the smaller provincial governments, like 
that of Balochistan, gear up to execute larger development programmes. 
 
Table 4 
Summary of the Deficit of the Federal and Provincial Governments 
(% of GDP) 
 
2009-10 
(Revised) 
2010-11 
(Budget) 
Projections,  
2010-11 
Without 7th 
NFC Award 
With 7th NFC 
Award 
Federal –5.7 –4.0 –4.4 –5.0 
Provincial –0.6 0.0 –0.5 –0.2 
Combined –6.3 –4.0 –4.9 –5.2 
 
5.  POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The basic factors contributing to the rise in the fiscal deficit are the decline in the 
fiscal effort of Provincial Governments and a big increase in expenditure in the 
anticipation of larger transfers mandated by the NFC Award. One way in which this 
tendency can be mitigated is to provide an incentive to provincial governments as part of 
the Award in the form of a matching grant equal to the increase in self-financing of 
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expenditure in relation to some minimum benchmark level, which will, of course, depend 
on the fiscal capacity of a particular provincial government, as follows: 
][ 0BENRG ppp   … … … … … … (16) 
If and only if G >0  
Where G = additional grant, B0= benchmark level.  
In this case 
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Based on the process of utility maximisation of the type described earlier, we 
obtain  
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A comparison with (16) reveals that in the presence of this incentive scheme the 
extent of reduction in fiscal effort is halved given the size of transfers, TF. 
Similarly, we have 
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The new expenditure equation when compared with (16) shows that the increase in 
expenditure associated with an increase in transfers is half of what it is likely to be in the 
absence of the incentive. 
Therefore, a matching grant linked to increase in self-financing will reduce the 
negative effects of the increase in transfers following an Award. It is recommended that 
such a scheme be put in place as part of the NFC Award, if not in the present award then 
in the next Award. 
The 11th Finance Commission of India has incorporated the above type of 
incentive with a view to providing for better financial management and greater fiscal 
discipline. As such, 7.5 percent of the revenues to the states is to be shared on the basis of 
the measure of financial discipline corresponding to the ratio of own revenue receipts to 
total revenue expenditure. 
 
6.  CONCLUSIONS 
The paper has analysed the impact of the 7th NFC Award on the size of the 
consolidated fiscal deficit of the Federal and Provincial Governments in 2010-11, the first 
year of implementation of the Award. A behavioural asymmetry is observed whereby 
federal current expenditure is inflexible downwards in the face of a decline in resources 
while provincial current expenditures show a big and rapid response to larger transfers. 
This asymmetry is the basic cause of any increase in the fiscal deficit although this is 
partially mitigated by enhanced fiscal effort by the federal governments and some lag in 
the rise in development spending by the provinces. Overall, it is estimated that the 
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consolidated fiscal deficit is higher by about 0.3 percent of the GDP due to the 
behavioural responses associated with the Award. The paper proposes an incentive 
scheme to reduce the negative effects arising from an Award which increases the share of 
the provinces.  
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